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INTRODUCTION
Narrative in the law is far from novel.' Narrative as a teaching
* Assistant Law Professor, CUNY Law School at Queens College; B.A. University of
Minnesota, 1971; J.D. Antioch School of Law, 1975. I am indebted to my colleagues Peter
Margulies,John Delaney, Susan Bryant, Kandis Scott, and Kerr Kreiling for their helpful sug-
gestions in writing this Article. I am grateful to my principal research assistant on this project,
Pius Bannis, for his extensive research contributions. In addition, I thank Nick Kambolis,
research assistant, for his valuable contributions to the production of this piece and Jeffrey
Cohan, research assistant, for his help.
1. There are at least three contributing sources to the development of narrative in legal
education and scholarship. These three sources are feminist theory, critical race theory, and
clinical legal education. See generally West,Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CHi. L. REV. 1 (1988)
(describing use of narrative in feminist jurisprudence); Culp, Autobiography. and Legbl Scholarship
and Teaching: Finding the Me in the Legal Academy, 77 VA. L. REV. 539 (1991) (illustrating use of
narrative in race theory literature); De Benedictis, Learning by Doing: The Clinical Skills Move-
ment Comes of Age, A.B.A. J., Sept. 1990, at 54 (positing that clinical education goes beyond
narrative form, yet encompasses similar concepts).
Feminist theory focuses on the differences between the lives of women and the lives of
"human beings" assumed under general legal theory. West, supra, at 42. Legal theory con-
centrates on the individual and questions of autonomy. In comparison, feminist theory is
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device in education is likewise not a recent invention.2 By contrast,
the use of narrative in legal instruction is both novel and innovative.
Storytelling is a useful pedagogical tool in the law school class-
room. In this Article, I discuss my use of short stories as a review
device for the basic rationales s encompassed within the Federal
Rules of Evidence (Federal Rules). In doing so, relevant portions of
the scholarly literature on "learning theory" regarding the use of
narratives in instruction are explained.4 I also discuss how story-
concerned with community and connection. Id. at 14 (explaining "connection thesis" which
finds difference between lives of women and men in that women are "actually or potentially
materially connected to other human life"); id. at 42 (discussing feminist theory critique of
legal assumption of individuation and autonomy which excludes values of women); id. at 65
(citing need to focus on stories about women to highlight legal exclusion ofvalues of intimacy
and nurturing). Narrative allows feminist legal scholars to illustrate how law recognizes only
male standards and excludes the values and concerns of women. Id. at 63-65. The goal of this
tactic is to change the law to recognize a distinct female voice. See Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE LJ.
1087, 1112-15 (1986) (discussing facts of rape case and requirement that victim's fear be
judged reasonable under male standard).
Racial minorities have also used narrative to "change the terms of the debate" and bring
their voice into legal scholarship. Culp, supra, at 545. Critical race theory attempts to incor-
porate personal anecdotes of minorities into legal discussion to emphasize that legal theory is
not neutral, but rather necessarily espouses a particular viewpoint. Id. at 546-50. For exam-
ple, presenting a black perspective in legal teaching allows black students to identify with the
subject matter and informs nonblack students of other possible analytical viewpoints. Id. at
553-54.
Clinical legal education goes one step further and places the student directly into a narra-
tive where each choice affects a client. De Benedictis, supra, at 57. Emphasis on educational
reform and public interest law means that students in clinic have direct contact with indigent
clients for perhaps the only time in their careers. Id. at 55, 58. Clinical education mergesmethod and subject to teach responsibility and develop skills through immersion in the facts
of a particular case. Id at 57.
2. See generally D. BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR RACIALJUS-
TICE (1987) (illustrating racial inequality and civil rights by beginning each chapter with meta-
phoric chronicle devised by author, and stating author uses narrative for classroom
instruction at Harvard Law School); 40 J. LEGAL EDUC. Mar.-June 1990 (dedicating entire
issue to symposium on pedagogy of narrative); 87 MIcH. L. REV. 2073 (1989) (devoting entire
August 1989 issue to use of narrative in law); Khosla & Williams, Economies of Minds A Collabo-
rative Reflection, 10 NOVA LJ. 619 (1986) (setting forth dialogue on gift and market economy
used by joint authors to teach contract and property law); Mashaw, Administrative Due Process:
The Quest for a Dignitary Theory, 61 B.U.L. REV. 885 (1981) (introducing core concepts regard-
ing dignitary theories of due process through means of dialogue).
My focus on the use of narrative as a review technique was not a subject of discussion in any
of the aforementioned articles. Narrative has, nevertheless, been used in law school courses
as a method promoting reflection on assigned readings. See Bell, Higgins & Suh, Racial Reflec-
tions: Dialogues in the Direction of Liberation, 37 UCLA L. REV. 1037, 1041-42 (1990) (concerning
required weekly written reflection on assigned readings in civil rights class);Johnson & Scales,
An Absolutely, Positively True Story: Seven Reasons Why We Sing, 16 N.M.L. REV. 433, 435 (1986)
(concerning authors' extensive use of narrative, dialogue, and verses of songs in teaching
jurisprudence to communicate vision of law as human drama and as potential liberation of
creativity).
3. Rationale, in this context, refers to the underlying reasons or the controlling princi-
ples for the existence of a particular rule of evidence.
4. See generally P. KLINE, THE EVERYDAY GENIUS: RESTORING CHILDREN'S NATURAL JoY
OF LEARNING--AND YOURS Too (1988) (finding traditional teaching methods defective and
advocating integrative learning based on relaxed and enjoyable learning environment); J.
QUINA, EFFECTIVE SECONDARY TEACHING: GOING BEYOND THE BELL CURVE (1989) (exploring
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telling in the law school classroom is part of the recent emergence
of the use of narrative in legal scholarship. 5 This scholarship inte-
grates an understanding of the human condition with the experi-
ence of law.6 In a similar vein, my storytelling is based on an
understanding of the human learning process and a desire that stu-
dents understand the human dimension in the existence and perpet-
uation of law.
Storytelling is an antidote to students' reliance on an over-restric-
tive form of legal positivism 7 by which students mechanically memo-
new methods for secondary school teaching that help students go beyond limits of linear
thinking and incorporate theory and practice in various modes of learning); C. ROSE, ACCEL-
ERATED LEARNING (1985) (discussing accelerated learning techniques that reject memorization
in favor of using power of association to employ conscious and subconscious thought simulta-
neously in learning process). I use the term "learning theory" to refer to the bodies of schol-
arly literature in the fields of psychology and education that examine the mental functions
used in the learning process. See P. KLINE, supra, at 19 (stating that recent literature on learn-
ing theory focuses on ways to match teaching to brain's functioning by moving away from
traditional educational environments and methods). This discipline is also referred to as "in-
tegrated learning," "accelerated learning," "optimal learning," "superlearning," "whole
brain learning," and "holistic learning." Id
5. See Blaustone, To Be of Service: The Lawyer's Aware Use of the Human Skills Associated with
the Perceptive Self, 15J. LEGAL PROF. 241, 245-56 (1991) (using fictional dialogue to introduce
theory that fundamental human skills play more important roles in successful lawyering than
recognized in traditional legal thought). I tend to instruct and write with heavy emphasis on
the narrative. I use exercises and role-playing extensively in classroom instruction. This is
the result of my study of learning theory and my individual predilection to conceptualize with
metaphor and narrative. Significantly, Alasdair MacIntyre used storytelling to begin his ex-
amination of moral theory. See A. MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MORAL THEORY 1-2
(1981) (using storytelling as backdrop for setting out basic structure and content of argument
on moral philosophy). Maclntyre places the reader in an imaginary time of environmental
disaster where the natural sciences are destroyed. Id at 1. The remnants of scientific knowl-
edge, even though devoid of value standing alone, are blindly embraced by the few enlight-
ened souls. Id Within this make-believe scenario, MacIntyre sets forth the basic structure
and content of his argument on moral philosophy. In addition, writers in law have also used
narrative in developing their philosophical and theoretical positions. SeeJ. SAMMONS, LAwYER
PROFESSIONALISM xi-xiii (1988) (employing dialogue to provoke critique of role of ethics in
law); Gabel & Kennedy, Roll Over Beethoven, 36 STAN. L. REV. i, ii (1984) (using dialogue to
present different philosophical perspectives within critical legal studies regarding value of
"traditional philosophical discourse").
6. See Ayer, Isn't There Enough Reality To Go Around? An Essay on the Unspoken Promises of
Our Law, 53 N.Y.U. L. REV. 475, 476 (1978) (advocating conceptual framework "for under-
standing the law as an essential human enterprise" that is product of integrated human func-
tioning). The quest for order in the legal system, which must deal with people en masse,
necessitates treating people alike as much as possible, instead of as individuals. Id at 478.
Lynne Henderson, like myself, does not view legality and human experience as mutually ex-
clusive. See Henderson, Legality and Empathy, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1574, 1575-77 (1987) (examin-
ing landmark Supreme Court cases from empathic perspective to incorporate emotions and
experience into explanation of decisions); see also Getman, Colloquy: Human Voice in Legal Dis-
course, 66 TEX. L. REV. 577, 577-78, 582-83 (1988) (lamenting inclusion of "professional
voice" in law at expense of "human voice" with result of isolating lawyers from concerns of
client).
7. I use "legal positivism" to refer to the isolated structural analysis of legal rules di-
vorced from surrounding circumstances and influences. See R. DWORIN, TAKING RIGHTS SE-
RIOUSLY 17 (1977) (defining legal positivism as set of legal rules, divorced from social or
moral rules, which govern all aspects of law); K. LEE, THE POSITIVIST SCIENCE OF LAw 3-4
(1989) (stating that legal positivist theorists deny any connection between law and morality).
456 THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:453
rize and regurgitate rules without understanding the purpose or
context of the law. Storytelling does not validate the myth of "ob-
jective analysis," the assumption that doctrine is the basic unit of
analysis for reality.' Rather, storytelling demonstrates that human
experience is the wellspring for the development of law. When the
policy reasons or the underlying purposes of the rules are articu-
lated, structure and meaning are given to' the rules. Thus, story-
telling contextualizes the rules in ways that show that, in reality,
facts are value-filled8 and not value-neutral.
I. TEACHING EVIDENCE: NARRATIVES ON THE LIFE OF
JOHN HENRY WIGMORE
The full text of four review narratives based on the life of John
Henry Wigmore appear in this Article, along with detailed annota-
tions to his treatise, Evidence in Trials at Common Law.9 The annota-
tions are provided to indicate consistency with or divergence from,
Wignore's commentary. Divergence occurs where necessary to
conform the content of the short story to the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence. Further, the annotations instruct the reader as to how I con-
structed the story to conform with my teaching objectives.
I use the life ofJohn Henry Wigmore as the setting for my review
narratives.10 I choose to acquaint students with Wigmore, as evi-
dence scholar, because of his authoritative contributions to this
body of doctrine. Wigmore is commonly regarded as the greatest
thinker in world history on evidence doctrine."I His treatise is used
worldwide as an authoritative text on the development of the com-
8. The term "value-filled" illustrates the influence of perception and predilection on
the identification and development of selected aspects of experience. These selected aspects
of experience are named "facts." See P. MacLean, On the Evolution of Three Mentalities, in 2 NEW
DIMENSIONS IN PSYCHIATRY, A WORLDVIEW 305, 310 (1977) (asserting facts are not valid in
abstract but rather derive validity from subjective "public assessment").
9. J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW (J.H. Chadbourn rev. 1979).
When reading the text of the review narratives, the reader should bear in mind that these
stories were written with a concern for easy listening. The design, structure, and expression
are geared for oral communication. The reader may, therefore, experience the short stories
differently than a listener would experience them. As a listener, the student is part of an
audience sharing a common experience, about which there can be discussion and application.
10. I also refer to my short stories as "review narratives."
11. At this point in history, judicial notice of this fact could take place in most court-
rooms. Most commentators acknowledge the outstanding role of Wigmore in writing his trea-
tise. See, e.g., McCormick, lVigniore, Nation's Greatest Legal Scholar, Passes, 6 TEx. BJ. 154, 154
(1943) (stating that Wigmore's treatise is "without question the greatest of Anglo-American
law treatises of all time" and that Wigmore was greatest American legal scholar of his genera-
tion); Kocourek, John. Henry Wigmnore-1863-1943, 29 A.B.A. J. 316, 316 (1943) (describing
Wigmore's treatise as "one of the greatest intellectual feats in law-writing of any age or of any
country"); Rutledge, Two Heroes of the Law, 29 A.B.A.J. 425, 425 (1943) (stating Wigmore's
work "stands preeminent among the greatest produced by American legal scholarship").
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mon law of evidence.1 2 Wigmore, a professor and dean at North-
western University School of Law in Illinois, was a prolific author of
many scholarly legal works, including tremendous contributions to
international law.' 3 In addition, Wigmore served on many high
commissions and committees that set policy and revised the law.' 4
He died in 1943.15
I created the short stories to reflect real events in Wigmore's life,
which I changed when necessary to reinforce the students' under-
standing of the Federal Rules of Evidence.16 I kept as close as possi-
ble to actual events and biographical data in order to set the context
for the story. I then fashioned a fictional story within this context in
order to accomplish the review of the specific doctrine.' 7
In the short stories, my intention was to keep Wigmore's perspec-
tive on the specific doctrines. Because my primary learning objec-
tive was to review the rationale of the Federal Rules of Evidence,
however, I focused on the current prevailing legal interpretation of
12. See Pound,John Henry Wigmore, 56 HARv. L. REV. 988, 988-89 (1943) (acknowledging
Wigmore's treatise as "standard" throughout English-speaking world).
13. See W. ROALFE, JOHN HENRY WIGMORE: SCHOLAR AND REFORMER 32-75 (1977) (dis-
cussing writings by Wigmore in fields of torts, criminal law, evidence, comparative law, and
negligence); id. at 166 (stating Wigmore wrote casebooks on torts and evidence that he used
in his teaching); id. at 250-64 (describing Wigmore's efforts to foster international coopera-
tion including active support for League of Nations and International Court of Justice and
works published from articles to multi-volume books).
14. See id. at 220-25 (discussing membership to American Bar Association committees
including Joint Committee on Improvement of Criminal Justice, Special Committee on Im-
provement of Procedure in Trials of Rate and Public Utility Cases, Committee on Develop-
ment of International Law Through International Conferences, Special Committee on
Coordination of State and Local Bar Associations, Criminal Law Section's Committee on
Courts and Wartime Social Protection); id, at 221 (stating Wigmore was chairman of Ameri-
can Bar Association's Section on Improvement in Law of Evidence); id. at 225 (citing Wig-
more's membership to American Institute of Criminal Law and Criminology); id. at 226
(describing Wigmore's involvement with American Law Institute, including membership to
Advisory Committee on International Justice, consultation on American Law Institute's Code
of Evidence, and service on National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws).
15. Roalfe, John Henry Wigmore-Scholar and Reformer, 53 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & PO-
LICE Sci. 277, 277-78 (1962) (stating Wigmore died at age of 80 in automobile accident while
returning from meeting of Chicago Bar Association of editorial board of The Journal of Criminal
Law, Criminology, and Police Science).
16. For each short story that follows, I will indicate which facts are biographically accu-
rate and which are fictional.
17. The initial work required researching Wigmore's life story. Only after a thorough
grounding in Wigmore's biographical data could I write these short stories. Most of the bio-
graphical data actually used comes from two sources. See W. ROALFE,JOHN HENRY WIGMORE:
SCHOLAR AND REFORMER (1977); Roalfe,John Henry lVigmore-Scholar and Reformer, 53 J. CRIM.
L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SC. 277 (1962). A full citation will be given throughout to clarify
which source I am referencing. For additional sources of biographical data on John Henry
Wigmore, see generally Chronology of the Career ofJohn Henry Wigmore, 32 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMI-
NOLOGY 261 (1941); Kocourek,john Henry ligmore, 24 GREEN BAG 3 (1912), reprinted in 13 ILL.
L. REV. 340 (1918); Kocourek,John Henry Wigniore-1863-1943, 29 A.B.A.J. 316 (1943); Chro-
nology of the 'igrnore Career, 29 A.B.A.J. 317 (1943); Clapp,John Henry Wigmore, 66 NJ.L.J. 244
(1943); Kuttner, Report of the Magister of the Riccobono Seminar of Roman Law in America, 3 JURIST
532, 537-38 (1943).
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the Federal Rules. I8 I styled the stories to place the students in
Wigmore's mind at the moments he was conceptualizing the ratio-
nales for various rules of evidence. My purpose in using this format
was to have students experience the formulation of underlying rea-
soning for the rules as an understandable mental process. Thus, I
intended to demystify the legal reasoning process for the students.
The student's experience with storytelling should be pleasant and
effortless. The story should cover the rationale and review the no-
menclature of the doctrine, while flowing smoothly to hold the lis-
tener's interest in the plot. In other words, the experience should
be the same as listening to a story that has captured one's atten-
tion. 19 This perspective on narrative was the catalyst for my deci-
sion to use Wigmore's life as the setting for the stories. Students
would be more attentive because this man's history comes to life. I
also wanted the stories to convey the reality that the creation of
legal rationale is a product of life experience. In using the life of
Wigmore, I sought to combine all of these objectives.
My storytelling was intended as a review and recall device in antic-
ipation of detailed testing on the evidential concepts through multi-
ple choice questions. Theoretically, the use of narrative in
instruction or self-study is intended to ease information into the stu-
dents' long-term memory. This is accomplished by reviewing the
rational connections within, and the overall structure of, the particu-
lar doctrines.20 In other words, storytelling is intended to assist stu-
18. I will indicate where Wigmore's rationale for the common law rules varies from the
prevailing interpretation of the Federal Rules of Evidence in the stories that follow. Further-
more, the reader should note that I cover points, such as the quasi-privilege for trial prepara-
tion materials, that Wigmore's treatise does not address. Usually, the doctrine treating
disclosure of trial preparation materials is taught as part of discovery in a Civil Procedure
course. I like to include this study, however, with coverage of the attorney-client privilege in
Evidence because it assists students in clarifying the relationship between the two.
19. After teaching evidence for four years, I decided to expose my students to narratives
as an additional means of reviewing doctrine covered in class. My decision to incorporate
storytelling into my teaching of evidence was an outgrowth of my individual foray into the
field of learning theory which, among other things, has included attention to the mental
processes of retention and recall. I posit that to adequately digest a body of legal doctrine,
the mind should be operating in a creative mode to recreate the structures and constructs of
the doctrinal analysis. SeeJohnson & Scales, supra note 2, at 434 (advocating optimizing learn-
ing potential of law students through use of multiple processes designed to free students
mentally for critical examination of themselves, law, and professional role of lawyers); see also
supra note 4 (providing background sources on learning theory); infra note 20 (discussing
development of learning theory in study of mental processes in improving memory).
20. Learning theory focuses on heightened retention, recall, and performance by the
activation of all mental processes in completing a particular assignment or learning unit. P.
KLINE, supra note 4, at 54. Dr. Georgi Lozanov of Bulgaria began the development of inte-
grated learning with his pioneering study of the mental processes of successful learners. id.
For the ease of learning, Dr. Lozanov's theory advocated recreating the conditions associated
with the first years of life, a period when there are few constraints or learning blocks to im-
pede the functioning of either halves of the brain. Id. at 65, 72-73. These early conditions are
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dents in their ability to understand, store, and later retrieve
information from their memory.
In addition to the careful structure of the narratives, I attempted
to apply the narrative in a manner that encouraged student learning.
To overcome students' potential resistance to this novel teaching
technique, I limited review narratives to no longer than eight or ten
minutes each. 2' Plus, during the sixteen weeks of instruction, the
four review narratives I read totaled no more than forty minutes of
class time.
At the end of a unit of my syllabus covering a portion of doctrine,
I read the students a short story as part of my review class on the
covered doctrine.2 2 These review sessions contain two components.
recreated by promoting curiosity and by overlaying several different modes of stimulation in
understanding any matter. G. LozANov, SUGGESTOLOGY AND OUTLINES OF SUGGESTOPEDY 5
(1979).
Dr. Lozanov's theory states that students will learn more with less required concentration if
the learning environment is relaxed in a way that stimulates both linear thinking and imagina-
tion. C. ROSE, ACCELERATED LEARNING 2, 11 (1985). Linear thinking and imagination com-
plement each other and, if the two are used together, lead to increased "potential of the brain
for learning and creativity." Id. at 13-14. To achieve integrated learning in the classroom,
lessons must be presented in context. This requires using realistic characters and everyday
experiences in teaching to stimulate the students' visualization. P. KLINE, supra note 4, at 224-
25. With logic and emotion working together, greater association allows for improved recall.
Id. at 180-81.
In the United States, there are a number of scholars engaged in using, extending, and
amending this basic theory of an integrated use of the self in the learning process. Among
these individuals are: Dr. Peter Kline, a former trainer at the Lozanov Learning Institute in
Washington and author of THE EVERYDAY GENIUS: RESTORING CHILDREN'SJOY OF LEARNING-
AND YOURS Too, supra note 4; Dr. James Quina, author of EFFECTIVE SECONDARY TEACHING:
GOING BEYOND THE BELL CURVE, supra note 4; and Dr. Ivan Barzakov, from the Barzak Educa-
tional Institute. For popular literature applying learning theory to such specific tasks as writ-
ing and drawing, see generally G. Rico, WRITING THE NATURAL WAY: USING RIGHT-BRAIN
TECHNIQUES TO RELEASE YOUR EXPRESSIVE POWERS (1983) (applying learning theory to writ-
ing); and B. EDWARDS, DRAWING ON THE RIGHT SIDE OF THE BRAIN (1979) (applying learning
theory to drawing).
In perceptual research, Dr. Paul MacLean developed the model of the triune brain as a
schema for achieving full human potential in any task. See generally MacLean, supra note 8, at
313 (asserting that, to function completely in creative tasks, one mustjointly use parts of brain
responsible for intellectual activity and parts responsible for feeling and emotion). Achieving
full human potential is possible when both the neo-cortex and the limbic system are engaged
in the activity. Id. at 317-18. The third part of the triune brain controls involuntary and lower
order functions. Id. at 319.
21. I confine the use of storytelling to the review process. Storytelling is also commonly
used, however, as an introductory device to establish a general overview of the subject matter
prior to a more specific, in-depth study. Because I was cautious, as well as conservative, re-
garding my students' acceptance of new teaching methods, I decided that it was a less abrupt
shift in learning style to use storytelling only as a small part of review. I thus exclude narra-
tive as a means of introducing segments of evidence doctrine. My reasoning for this exclusion
was that the students' anxiety regarding new material would increase the likelihood of impa-
tience with a method distinct from traditional lecture, Socratic discussion, problem solving,
and note taking.
22. My course, Lawyering and the Public Interest (LAPI I), is the first semester of a two
semester course that includes exposure to alternative dispute resolution, mediation, introduc-
tion to trial practice, and evidence. The evidence coverage is divided between two semesters.
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First, I read aloud the short story. Students are asked to relax and
not to take notes. 23  No immediate discussion follows the story-
telling. Rather, questions and comments occur later in the class or
in a future class. Immediately following the review narrative, I give
multiple choice review questions covering in detail the doctrine in
the particular section of the course. These questions are given
under exam conditions and, afterward, the class discusses both the
correct and incorrect answers. I use this review format to prepare
students for my multiple choice final examination in Evidence, as
well as to expose them to MultiState Bar Examination conditions.
The text of the four short stories used in my review sessions fol-
lows this introduction. Afterwards, I discuss my observations on
their value as a device for learning evidence.
A. Narrative One: Relevancy and Its Limits
The Federal Rules of Evidence govern proceedings before the courts of the
United States and United States Magistrates.24 The following short story
concerns the general concept of relevancy25 and the Federal Rules that affect
the admission of relevant evidence. 2 6 More specifically, the narrative focuses
on the exclusion of relevant evidence on the basis of prudice, confusion, or
unnecessary delay,2 7 the general inadmissability of character evidence to
prove the likelihood of conduct,28 and subsequent remedial measures. 29 Fi-
nally, the story incorporates the policy objectives underlying compromises and
offers of compromise between parties. 30
John Henry Wigmore is eight years old, quite a precocious lad
and of good parentage.3' We find him attending his third day of
Generally speaking, the first semester includes all the rules of evidence except reliability is-
sues, hearsay, and impeachment, which are fully covered in the second semester.
There are approximately 150 students enrolled in LAPI I. I teach my evidence classes twice
a week. At the beginning of the week, I usually teach the class twice in groups of approxi-
mately 75 students. Dividing the class into two sections permits more classroom participation
and a smaller, more effective, group dynamic. At the end of the week, I teach one class to all
150 students. Regular classroom instruction leading up to the review sessions includes the
Socratic method, lecture, case analysis, and the use of problems.
23. Integrative learning theory stresses the need to relax in order to improve learning.
See P. KLINE, supra note 4, at 72 (emphasizing that traditional classroom setting produces neg-
ative tensions that cause students to "downshift" and respond automatically rather than using
intellect).
24. FED. R. EvID. 101.
25. FED. R. EvID. 401.
26. FED. R. EVID. 402.
27. FED. R. EVID. 403.
28. FED. R. EvID. 404.
29. FED. R. EvWD. 407.
30. FED. R. EViD. 408.
31. There is more to Wigmore than his contributions to law. Race, gender, and class
undeniably influenced how he perceived the universe in the early part of the twentieth cen-
tury. To a degree, these factors must have influenced his theoretical, ideological, and ethical
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classes in a new private school.32 John Henry is agitated. The boys
teased him outside on the playground before class this morning. He
is now seated in his classroom to begin the day. At least he thinks
he likes his new teacher, yesterday she accompanied him to the
room and was nice.
Now, a man suddenly comes into the classroom and announces,
"John Henry Wigmore, where are you? You are to come with me!
You are in the wrong classroom! I'm supposed to be your
teacher!"33 This man terrified little John Henry and was more than
John Henry could bear. John Henry clung to the legs of his desk
and would not let go. Out of terror, he wrapped himself around his
desk. The teacher came over and started to tug. The teacher
tugged and tugged at John Henry, but John Henry would not let go.
Instead, John Henry held on tighter and tighter. For the moment,
the teacher gave up, and all the children were dismissed for lunch.
John Henry's parents were outraged at the psychological damage
done to their precious child, in addition to the scrapes and bruises
the teacher inflicted. The Wigmores sued the school and teacher
for civil assault, battery, and negligence in the school's operations,
that is, a lack of care in admitting new students.
The school was horrified at the extremity of the Wignores' reac-
tions. First, the school authorities saw no connection between the
erroneous assignment to the wrong classroom and the subsequent
actions of the teacher. These two facts were wholly separate from
one another. The error in room assignment really sheds no light on
approaches to evidence. As a result of my short stories, I have received undocumented re-
ports of Wigmore's anti-woman bias. These short stories are not intended to justify John
Henry Wigmore's biases, value system, or social class. The primary goals of the C.U.N.Y.
curriculum are to promote diversity of perspectives and greater inclusion of under-
represented peoples into the legal profession.
32. Although Wigmore did suffer the indignity of the assault described in this story on
the third day of attending a new school, in actuality this was John Henry's first exposure to
public school. I have altered the facts of this story. Most notably, I changed the scenario from
the actual site of the event to a private school. This change was necessitated to permit litiga-
tion against the school in the short story without reference to issues of sovereign immunity.
Also, the actual assailant was the superintendent and not a classroom teacher. In addition,
the facts other than the mere occurrence of the assault are made up. The short story's entire
exploration of litigation by the Wigmores and their subsequent interaction with the school
authorities are entirely fictional. In actuality, after Wigmore's traumatic third day in public
school, his mother transferred John Henry into the Urban Academy, a prestigious private
school where he did quite well. For a description of the actual occurrence, see generally
Roalfe, John Henry Wigmore-Scholar and Reformer, 53 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI.
277, 297 (1962); W. ROALFE,JOHN HENRY WIGMORE: SCHOLAR AND REFORMER 3 (1977). The
reader will note the interesting development of the facts in the latter publication.
33. See supra note 32 (describing Wigmore's actual first days of classes in new school). As
mentioned previously, the aggressor was the superintendent at the public school. Further-
more, the quoted statements were not actually uttered but were added for purposes of this
Article.
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the teacher's use of physical force against John Henry. It is simply
not logically relevant to infer that the behavior of the teacher was
triggered by John Henry's placement, rather than being triggered
by the teacher's own inherent propensities.3 4
The school set about to make things right. First, the school fired
the teacher. This was simply the last in a long series of incidents
where this teacher had responded poorly to the tender sensibilities
of these young souls. Second, the principal issued a memo to all of
the teachers discussing the need for restraint when dealing with hys-
terical children. The memo set forth new rules-requiring teachers to
call for one of the staff from the assistant principal's office to come
immediately to the classroom in the event that a child becomes hys-
terical. The staff member is to observe the condition of the hysteri-
cal child and then to confer with the teacher regarding what
measures should be taken.35
After taking these actions, the school contacted the Wigmores and
their attorney. A meeting was held at which all lawyers and parties
were present. The school authorities apologized to the Wigmores
and admitted that the teacher's actions were inappropriate. The
school advised the Wigmores of the steps they had taken after the
event occurred. Further, the school authorities offered to settle the
matter by paying a small sum to make matters whole.3 6 The
34. See FED. R. EVID. 401 (defining minimal logical relevance). This paragraph gives an
example of minimal logical relevance in accord with the definition of Federal Rule of Evidence
(Federal Rule) 401. This explanation is also in accord with Wigmore's discussion of the com-
mon law principle of relevance. See IA J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW
§ 27, at 965 (P. Tillers rev. 1983) (stating that offering of fact into evidence is implication that
fact has some bearing on proposition at issue). The question of logical relevance is essentially
one of the ordinary laws of reasoning, regardless of whether the question is to be decided by a
judge or a layperson. lId The logical powers employed in the court must be those ofeveryday
life, rather than those of a trained expert. Id Moreover, the logic employed in the court is
frequently unarticulated and applied in an instinctive, and possibly nonsystematic, fashion.
Id.
35. See FED. R. EVIO. 407 (setting forth general rule of inadmissibility of subsequent re-
medial measures and rule's exceptions). This paragraph sets up several illustrations of subse-
quent remedial measures that would be excluded from admission into evidence under Federal
Rule 407. The prevailing interpretation of Federal Rule 407 is in accord with Wigmore's
discussion of the common law rule. See 2J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW
§ 283(4), at 174 (J.H. Chadbourn rev. 1979) (discussing repairs of machine or highway after
injury and taking measures to remedy injury). .
Subsequent remedial measures after an injury do not always indicate a belief by the owner
that the owner's negligence caused the injury. Id. Rather, the owner's remedial measures
merely indicate a belief that the injury-causing object was capable of causing such an injury,
and nothing more. Id. This rationale is equally consistent with a belief of injury by mere
accident or by contributory negligence, as well as by the owner's own negligence. Id. Conse-
quently, because acts of repair or improvement do not necessarily lead to an inference of
negligence, such acts shall be excluded from evidence. Id. Furthermore, subsequent reme-
dial measures should be excluded because admission may lead the jury to unjustly overem-
phasize the repairs or actions, serving to chill innocent and genuine acts of repair. Id.
36. This paragraph illustrates discussions which are covered in protected settlement dis-
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Wigmores accepted the offer and dropped the litigation. John
Henry acclimated to his new environment and subsequently did well
at this school.
Later in life, we see John Henry pondering this earlier incident,
which he still remembers as though it were only yesterday. Actually,
John Henry had been day-dreaming in the midst of writing his trea-
tise on evidence. John Henry reflects "the school was right!" There
is no minimal logical relevancy between the classroom placement
and the later assault upon him.3 7 One's mind, in deliberating the
truth of what happened here, should not be pressed with unneces-
sary facts in coming to judgment. Distraction and subjective distor-
tion should be kept to a minimum.3 8
In pondering further, John Henry believes that what the school
did after this assault positively reflected upon the school's adminis-
trators. All individuals and institutions should unabashedly and reg-
ularly remedy matters they encounter-regardless of whether such
individuals and institutions are technically at fault for the mishap. Is
it not a worthy goal to have people strive to be better? Shouldn't
people attend to how their goods and services affect others?3 9
Also, given that John Henry was a gentle spirit, he thinks it is a
virtue to admit wrong and settle one's accounts. To avoid the situa-
tion and promote conflict simply results in additional waste of en-
ergy by all persons involved.40 John Henry amuses himself by
cussions under Federal Rule 408. Rule 408 is in accord with Wigmore's description of the
common law principle. Under the common law, an offer to settle a claim by partial or com-
plete payment does not amount to an admission of liability. 4J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRI-
ALS AT COMMON LAW § 1061, at 34 (J.H. Chadbourn rev. 1972). Behind this policy is the
rationale that hypothetical or conditional concessions can never be interpreted as an assertion
of a party's actual belief, L; see id § 1061, at 33-34 (discussing alternative theories for inad-
missibility of settlement offers).
37. See supra note 34 and accompanying text (giving example of minimal logical rele-
vance). This example is in accord with Wigmore's explanation of relevance and Federal Rule
401. See IAJ. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 27, at 965 (P. Tillers rev.
1983) (describing Wigmore's conception of logical relevancy).
38. This portion of the story and its reasoning are intended to review the rule of exclu-
sion due to prejudicial effect, Federal Rule 403, as well as the admission of relevant back-
ground information pursuant to Federal Rule 401. See IAJ. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT
COMMON LAW § 29(a), at 978 (P. Tillers rev. 1983) (discussing cases and hypotheticals in
which otherwise relevant evidence should be inadmissible). Under the common law, relevant
evidence may be inadmissible because of other factors such as confusion of issues, unfair
surprise, or undue prejudice. Id
39. See 2 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 283, at 175 (J.H.
Chadbourn rev. 1982) (acknowledging legitimacy of policy argument with particular emphasis
on potential undue influence on jury of subsequent remedial measure evidence). Further-
more, this statement corresponds to the prevailing interpretation of Federal Rule 407. See
FED. R. EVID. 407 advisory committee's note (stating that exclusion of subsequent remedial
measures promotes social policy of encouraging people to pursue steps in furtherance of ad-
ded safety).
40. See 4 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1061, at 33-47 (J.H.
Chadbourn rev. 1972) (expounding on settlement discussions). Actually, this is not an accu-
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labeling such behavior as virtuous-a term Many of his colleagues
rarely used when discussing human motivation.
John Henry continues, lost in his reflections. His focus now re-
turns to that terrifying man who changed that day at school into
such a nightmare. It may have been that this errant teacher was
prone to this type of behavior with his students. The school admit-
ted that this was so by informing his family that the teacher had
been terminated.4 1 John Henry now muses how dangerous it would
be to judge this man not for what he did to John Henry, but on what
he had done before. 42 Dangerous because it seems to John Henry
that to judge guilt in this case by relying on the man's previous his-
tory increases the chance that the inquiry would change from an ex-
amination of what the teacher had done in this particular incident
into an examination of the man himself-his character!43 Should
there be no mercy? How wrong is it to continue to judge a person
rate statement of the scholar's sentiments regarding settlement discussions. Wigmore found
the rationale that the expectation of privacy in negotiation promotes settlement to be a dubi-
ous theory. Id. § 106 1, at 34-35. Wigmore doubted whether recognizing privacy of commu-
nication is necessary to foster private settlements and whether the benefit from the reduction
in litigation under such privilege outweighs the justice that is affected by the free flow of
evidence made available through denying the privilege. Id § 1061, at 35. Nonetheless, the
advisory committee note to Federal Rule 408 explicitly validates this theory. See FED. R. EvID.
408 advisory committee's note (stating that excluding evidence of offers to compromise pro-
motes compromise and settlement of disputes).
41. I use these facts as an example of admissions of fact not to be excluded from evi-
dence on the grounds that disclosure occurred during settlement discussions. See United
States v. Shotwell Mfg. Co., 287 F.2d 667, 673 (7th Cir. 1961) (drawing distinction between
offers to do something in furtherance of compromise that are inadmissible, and independent
admissions of fact that are admissible), aft'd, 371 U.S. 341, reh g denied, 372 U.S. 950 (1963).
42. Here I introduce an example-ofprior'bad acts to show character as contemplated by
the rule of exclusion in Federal Rule 404(b). See FED. R. EVID. 404(b) (stating rule that evi-
dence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove character).
43. See 1AJ. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 57, at 1180-81 (P. Tillers
rev. 1983) (discussing rationale behind excluding evidence of accused's moral disposition).
Wigmore points out the absence of probative value in such an argument. Wigmiore recog-
nized that, although the accused's moral disposition may be of value in indicating the
probability of whether the accused did or did not engage in a particular act, such evidence
should be excluded. Id § 57, at 1180-81. Policy operates to exclude relevant evidence to
avoid undue prejudice and unjust condemnation that may accrue to the accused, resulting not
from the act but from his character. Id.
Various courts have affirmed this basic principle. See, e.g., Michelson v. United States, 335
U.S. 469, 475-76 (1948) (stating that common law rule generally excludes evidence of ac-
cused's character because such evidence tends to be prejudicial to one with bad general rec-
ord and serves to deny fair opportunity to defend against particular charge); Reyes v. Missouri
Pac. R.R., 589 F.2d 791, 793-94 (5th Cir. 1979) (holding that character evidence is of slight
probative value yet very prejudicial); United States v. James, 555 F.2d 992, 1001 (D.C. Cir.
1977) (stating that evidence of defendant's prior crimes diverts jury's attention from defend-
ant's responsibility for crime charged to improper question of defendant's bad character);
United States v. Fox, 473 F.2d 131, 134-35 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (holding that admission of evi-
dence of bad character increases possibility that defendant will be convicted of being "bad
man" injury's eyes, rather than being tried for crime that defendant was charged). The advi-
sory committee note to Federal Rule 404(b), however, omits discussion of the underlying
theory for exclusion of character evidence. FED. R. EVID. 404 advisory committee's note.
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in the present by focusing on prior behavior? Instead, shouldn't so-
ciety encourage people to mend their ways by looking to a future
that is not burdened with past judgments? John Henry sees this
protection as deterring further anti-social behavior.44
John Henry now jostles himself from his musings. He is then able
to write a learned commentary on why these social values deserve
protection and, thus, why his fellow esquires should not be permit-
ted to disregard these values in the courtroom. He writes late into
the night, page after page of admonition supporting the forbearance
of considering relevant evidence in coming to judgment where there
is valid social policy regarding how individuals should conduct their
affairs with one another. It seems a reasonable trade-off to John
Henry to perhaps deny justice in an individual case by prohibiting
relevant evidence from reaching the ears of the jury to better the
quality of life experienced in daily public interaction.45
B. Narrative Two: Privileged Communications and the
Attorney's Work Product Protection
The following short story reviews some of the general rules of privilege and
quasi-privilege. The narrative covers the physician-patient privilege, the at-
torney-client privilege, and the rule protecting attorney work product.4 6
Although the principle of work product protection is not embodied in the
Federal Rules,4 7 it is sufficiently related to the concepts of privileged commu-
nications to warrant a single presentation.
Again, we find John Henry Wigmore engrossed in writing his
treatise on evidence. We find him working outside on his porch.
He faces Lake Michigan, which he finds encourages a nice mixture
44. See supra note 43 (discussing Wigmore's rationale for this rule of law).
45. See 1AJ. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 29(a), at 978 (P. Tillers
rev. 1983) (discussing policy reasons for discarding relevant evidence). Section 29(a) is more
of a discussion that generically deals with the role of practical policy counteracting relevancy.
Thus, Wigmore does not make the deduction that I do in the last sentence of this paragraph
in the text.
46. FED. R. EVID. 501. Federal Rule 501 provides:
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United States or provided by
Act of Congress or in rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory
authority, the privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or political subdivi-
sion thereof shall be governed by the principles of the common law as they may be inter-
preted by the courts of the United States in the light of reason and experience.
However, in civil actions and proceedings, with respect to an element of a claim or
defense as to which State law'supplies the rule of decision, the privilege of a witness,
person, government, State, or political subdivision thereof shall be determined in
accordance with State law.
Id. (emphasis added).
47. See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507-14 (1947) (creating common law protec-
tion of mental processes of attorney in relation to matters being litigated); see also FED. R. Civ.
P. 26(b)(3) (codifying and slightly modifying common law attorney work product protection).
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of concentration, and day-dreaming.48
John Henry is contemplating the evolution of privileged commu-
nications in the doctrine of evidence. He has always felt that this
area of evidence law is hazardous to American justice because privi-
lege can hide from trial information that is vital to the ascertainment
of truth.49
John Henry is an avid pianist and composer.50 Such abilities were
cultivated during his youth when he was required to practice piano
more than he cares to remember.5 1 John Henry begins to reminisce
about the creation of his favorite small composition written on the
eve of attending Harvard Law School.
John Henry remembers how he could not stop playing this partic-
ular tune. It haunted him all the time. He knew he did not have it
quite right. He had to keep playing it until he got it just right.
During this same time John Henry developed difficulty with his
left wrist. John Henry's wrist would bother him when playing the
piano. John Henry had to play the piano while composing his tunes.
John Henry thought it wise to consult a physician to determine the
cause of his difficulty, which was interfering with the completion of
his new musical composition. He was becoming chronically dis-
tracted with this incomplete tune inside his head.52
The physician determined that the bones in John Henry's wrist
were unstable and that a tight bandage when playing the piano,
along with exercises to strengthen the muscles in the wrist, were all
that was necessary to aid John Henry's recovery. John Henry fol-
48. Roalfe,John Henry Wigmore-Scholar and Reformer, 53J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & PO-
LICE Scx. 277, 297-98 (1962). Wigmore did live for a period of time on shore front property
at Lake Michigan. I do not know whether, in fact, this home came equipped with a porch
permitting a view of the lake.
49. See 8J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW §§ 2285-2287, at 527-40
(J.T. McNaughton rev. 1961) (discussing confidential communications in general). Wigmore
states that only a "preponderance of extrinsic policy" will justify the recognition of the princi-
ple of privilege. Id. § 2285, at 527. Wigmore also cautions against expanding the law of
privilege. He believes that four conditions are necessary to establish a privilege against the
disclosure of communications: (1) the communications must originate in confidence or else
they will not be disclosed; (2) this confidentiality must be essential to the "full and satisfactory
maintenance" of the party's relations; (3) in the community's opinion, the relation ought to be
fostered; and, (4) the injury resulting from disclosure of the communication must outweigh
the benefit gained from litigation. Id.
50. See Roalfe, John Henry Wigore-Scholar and Reformer, 53J. GRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY &
POLICE Sci. 277, 298 (1962) (describing Wigmore's study of music); W. ROALFE, JOHN HENRY
WIGMORE: SCHOLAR AND REFORMER 67-68 (1977) (recounting Wigmore's musical abilities).
51. Roalfe, John Henry Wigmore-Scholar and Reformer, 53 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & P0-
LICE Scm. 277, 298 (1962).
52. See id. (stating that Wigmore was often at piano playing his tunes and other songs at
parties); W. ROALFE,JOHN HENRY WiGMORE: SCHOLAR AND REFORMER 9, 67-68 (1977) (stating
same). The particular episode in this story, however, is fictional. I created this scenario to
facilitate the review of privilege.
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lowed the doctor's instructions and was able to complete his tune
later that week. Thereafter, he often played the tune at social gath-
erings. It was an upbeat, rhythmic, playful tune. In the months that
followed, his wrist again became stable and strong.
Turning his thoughts now to privileged communications, John
Henry questions himself about this earlier episode with his wrist.
He has always-felt uneasy about the creation of a physician-patient
privilege by legislative action within the different states of the
union.53 He felt this development was undeserved when examined
in light of the factors that common law deemed necessary for the
recognition of any privilege.54 John Henry knows he is powerless to
destroy the avalanche of state statutes enacting physician-patient
privileges. He should be able to influence thoughtful legal thinkers,
however, about the states' mistakes, and perhaps over time, this un-
fortunate privilege would dissolve into history.55
Take John Henry's case for example. He was certain that he pos-
sessed no interest in keeping secret what he said to his doctor. After
all, a wrist is a wrist and there is no basis to be self-conscious about
it. He sought the doctor's attention purely for a remedy. He never
thought that his communications with the doctor were encouraged
by an awareness of a shield of secrecy to protect what he said during
treatment. 56 In reality, such a concept seems quite unnecessary. It
may be that, in some instances, a patient might feel that the later
revelation of communications with a physician has infringed upon
one's subjective experience of privacy. But, that is a matter of indi-
53. See 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAw § 2380(a), at 829-31 (J.T.
McNaughton rev. 1961) (explaining that there is no plausible justification for protecting com-
munications between patients and physicians). The rationale courts commonly invoked as
justification for the physician-patient privilege is that full and open disclosure is necessary to
enable physicians properly to prescribe relief for their patients. See, e.g., Edington v. Mutual
Life Ins., 67 N.Y. 185, 194 (1871) (stating that disclosure of secrets revealed at sickbed de-
stroys confidence between patient and physician and prevents flow of benefits from such a
confidential relationship); P. RICE, EVIDENCE: COMMON LAW AND FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE
§ 9.0 lB, at 1032-33 (2d ed. 1990) (discussing traditional rationale of physician-patient privi-
lege and noting that privilege is only part of state jurisprudence and not Federal Rules of
Evidence); 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2380(a), at 828-32 (J.T.
McNaughton rev. 1961) (discussingjustification articulated in support of privilege and testing
arguments in light of four fundamental canons that must be satisfied by every privileged com-
munication). Wigmore found the rationale for the privilege to be tenuous. Id.
54. See 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2380(a), at 829-32 (J.T.
McNaughton rev. 1961) (discussing why physician-patient privilege does not comply with
"fundamental canons" needed to be satisfied by every privilege for communications); supra
note 49 (listing common law factors to determine whether type of communications deserve
protection as privilege).
55. See 8J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAw § 2380(a), at 832 (J.T. Mc-
Naughton rev. 1961) ("There is little to be said in favor of the privilege and a great deal to be
said against it. The adoption of it in any other jurisdiction is earnestly to be deprecated.").
56. See id. (noting that Wigmore sees few situations where patients actually attempt to
preserve real secrecy).
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vidual sensitivity. Such sensitivity does not, however, reasonably
seem to cause a person to forego medical aid. Nor did it strike John
Henry that his doctor needed a shield of future secrecy to treat
him.57 All the doctor needed to do was manipulate the wrist and
discuss the matter with John Henry. Even where a sensitive matter
is involved, the balance should be struck in favor of disclosure when
the evidence is relevant to a matter being litigated. To do otherwise
would cripple a fundamental attribute of trial-the pristine adver-
sarial development of historical fact.58
John Henry continues, lost in these mental meanderings. He be-
gins to hypothesize! Now the case would have been different if his
tune writing was interrupted not by a physical limitation, but by a
perplexing emotional question. John Henry thought, how lucky he
was that he rarely experienced writer's block in finishing a tune or in
anything else for that matter.59 But-suppose he had! If he went to
either a physician or counselor regarding this malaise, he could
readily see how his candor regarding his innermost thoughts would
be chilled by the knowledge that, in the interests of justice, some
litigant could later force a public airing of such communications.
John Henry thus decides to separate these two situations into differ-
ent privileged communications for separate doctrinal treatment. 60
57. Wigmore specifically outlines this argument. See id. § 2380(a), at 830 (finding that
people sought medical treatment in generation before establishment of privilege, and con-
cluding that people are not deterred from seeking medical help because of possibility of dis-
closure in court).
58. See id. § 2380(a), at 830-32 (concluding that injury to physician-patient relation not
greater than injury to justice by repressing medical testimony needed to learn truth).
59. This portion is a transition from physician-patient privilege to psychotherapist-pa-
tient privilege.
60. Although Wigmore cites the existence ofprivileged communication for psychologists
in some state jurisdictions, he does not discuss the matter. See 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN
TRIALS AT COMMON LAw § 2286, at 534-35 n.23 (citing only state statutes protecting commu-
nications to psychologists). Thus, the rationale for the psychotherapist-patient privilege is
absent from his treatise. Nevertheless, there is federal case law that recognizes the psycho-
therapist-patient privilege. See, e.g., In re Zuniga, 714 F.2d 632, 639 (6th Cir.) (concluding that
psychotherapist-patient privilege is mandated by "reason and experience"), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 983 (1983); In re GrandJury Subpoena, 710 F. Supp. 999, 1015 (D.N.J. 1989) (holding
that psychotherapist-patient privilege exists in context of federal grand jury subpoenas);
Sabree v. United Bhd. of Carpenters &Joiners of Am., Local No. 33, 126 F.R.D. 422, 424-26
(D. Mass. 1989) (applying state statute recognizing psychotherapist-patient privilege to pre-
clude discovery of records of worker's psychotherapist in action by worker against union for
racial discrimination); United States v. Friedman, 636 F. Supp. 462, 462-63 (S.D.N.Y. 1986)
(holding records containing intensely personal communications as protected by privilege);
Jennings v. D.H.L. Airlines, 101 F.R.D. 549, 550-51 (N.D. Il. 1984) (finding psychologist's
records of former employee protected by privilege). But see, e.g., United States v. Lindstrom,
698 F.2d 1154, 1167 (11th Cir. 1982) (recognizing privacy interest of patient in medical
records and societal interest in encouraging free flow of information embodied in psycholo-
gist-patient privilege, but noting that those interests are subordinate to defendant's right to
cross-examine witnesses in criminal case); United States v. Meagher, 531 F.2d 752, 753-54
(5th Cir. 1976) (declining to recognize privilege for communications between psychiatrist and
patient that were made while defendant was voluntary member of psychiatrist's study in crimi-
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As John Henry reorganizes his notes on privilege, he poses a
question to himself. Other than his personal deep esteem for the
legal profession, why does he accord complete primacy to secrecy in
communications occurring in the attorney-client relation and yet
deny it to medical doctors?6' Clearly, he feels that lawyers have
more responsibility than doctors for influencing the moral develop-
ment and actual behavior of the public. It inures to the attorney's
function as counsel to give advice on matters that would never have
been disclosed in the absence of confidentiality. 62 John Henry con-
cludes that the attorney-client relationship is actually more similar
to the psychotherapist-patient privilege because both professional
relationships cannot exist in the real world without a strong guaran-
tee of privacy.63
John Henry thus continued to write about the important distinc-
tions between the medical and legal professions and the lack of
comparison in the medical profession's direct impact on the admin-
istration of justice. In fact, John Henry recalls one of his cases
where he represented a fellow musician and composer (a talented
player but rather a flat composer) in a contract action against a local
concert hall. John Henry's observations of the defendant's business
practices and his development of legal theories regarding implied
breach were a product of his mental energies in crafting a tight case
out of a muddle of facts.64 Although these materials were not privi-
nal behavior); United States v. Witt, 542 F. Supp. 696, 697-99 (S.D.N.Y.) (holding that gen-
eral practitioner who did not profess to be psychologist or psychiatrist was not entitled to
invoke psychotherapist-patient privilege to avoid producing records), aff'd, 697 F.2d 301 (2d
Cir. 1982); United States v. Layton, 90 F.R.D. 520, 520 (N.D. Cal. 1981) (concluding that
privilege does not exist at common law and, therefore, does not exist at federal law).
The report of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary regarding Article V of the Federal
Rules of Evidence indicated that the Committee did not disapprove of the psychotherapist-
patient privilege. See S. REP. No. 1277, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 6, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 7051, 7053 (recognizing physician-patient privilege but applying it
only to psychotherapists).
61. See 8J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2380(a), at 831 (J.T. Mc-
Naughton rev. 1961) (distinguishing two privileges and putting forward particular grounds
for protecting confidentiality of attorney-client communications). Wigmore states that the
physician's curative aid is commonly rendered irrespective of the patient's making of disclo-
sures. Id. § 2380(a), at 830-32. Further, the relations with the patient are not consciously
affected because physicians are rarely called upon to make such disclosures. Id. Communica-
tions between physicians and their patients, thus, should not be protected to the same extent
as communications between attorneys and their clients. Id.
62. 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2380(a), at 831 (J.T. Mc-
Naughton rev. 1961).
63. See id § 2380(a), at 828-32 (finding fault with rationale put forward by medical pro-
fession in support of protecting communications). Wigmore recommends enacting legisla-
tion allowing courts to require disclosure where necessary. Id. § 2380(a), at 832.
64. I am setting up an example for the law on disclosure of trial preparation materials in
general, and the protection of an attorney's mental impressions, opinions, and legal theories
in particular.
470 THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:453
leged communications with his client, these matters deserved pro-
tection 'from his overzealous adversary. Why? Because John
Henry's exercise of his mental processes comprised his abilities to
render legal representation. Pilfering his thoughts would directly
have thwarted the administration ofjustice in this case. How could
John Henry go about the business of preparing a matter if he was
always simultaneously concerned that his adversaries would be
given the fruits of his toil to defeat his efforts? 65 The judge was
correct in that case to deny John Henry's adversary the opportunity
to fish in such fertile waters.
John Henry jostled himself back to concentrating on his chapter
addressing privileged communications. This concern for the safe-
guarding of attorneys' materials from the uncontrolled appetites of
adversaries does not fall within the scope of his scholarly discourse
on privilege. Rather, this matter should be attended to by other
scholars writing about the regulation of pre-trial activities of
lawyers.
C. Narrative Three: Refreshing Memory, Authentication,
and Witness Competency
This short story reviews several evidentiay concepts relating to the use of
witnesses and the use of writings in trial. Specifically, the narrative will
begin with the use of writings to refresh memory, 66 the hearsay exception of
recorded recollection, 67 authentication and identification,68 self-authentica-
tion, 69 and the contents of writings, recordings, and photographs. 70 Fi-
nally, the narrative reviews judicial notice of adjudicative facts, 71 witness
competence, 72 and Deadman statutes. 73
We findJohn Henry Wigmore intensely studying a variety of maps
and guide books for a sojourn into the countryside of northern Cali-
fornia.74 John Henry had always wanted to explore the more re-
65. See 4J. MOORE, W. TAGGART & J. WICKER, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 26.63[7]-
[10], at 26-329 to 26-347 (2d ed. 1991) (discussing Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947)
and subsequent codification of attorney work product protection in Rule 26(b)(3) of the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure).
66. FED. R. EVID. 612.
67. FED. R. EVID. 803(5).
68. FED. R. EvID. 901.
69. FED. R. EVID. 902.
70. FED. R. EvID. 1001-1004.
71. FED. R. EVID. 201.
72. FED. R. EvID. 601-603.
73. See infra note 79 (discussing Deadman Statutes).
74. See W. ROALFE, JOHN HENRY WIGMORE: SCHOLAR AND REFORMER 74 (1977) (noting
that Wigmore loved to travel, researched history of places of interest in preparing itineraries,
and was reputed to avidly study maps and guide books in preparation for trips). California
was Wigmore's state of birth, as well as a place he lived for some years. Roalfe,John Henry
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mote parts of the California mountains. He was born and grew up
in California, and felt that he should see more of rural California.
He wanted to see the majestic scenery but stay away from tourist
spots. John Henry had a reputation for loving to travel and plan-
ning novel routes for getting from here to there.
John Henry has been compiling alternate routes, making lists of
the specific sites he wants to see, and computing the distances in-
volved to determine where overnight lodging would be necessary, in
order to make advance reservations at local inns or arrange to stay
with friends.
Also onJohn Henry's desk is blank paper used to record all of the
items to be packed in his car and luggage. He will later store the list
in a safe place in the event of theft or other mishap.75 John Henry is
known for being a thoughtful organizer of life's events, so this ob-
session with detail should surprise no one. He would often say,
"Make a record of everything as you are in the midst of everything.
Better prepared than sorry."
A week later we find John Henry happily driving rural dirt roads
through secluded areas of the mid-California coastal mountain
ranges. As luck would have it, John Henry's trip was abruptly
detoured on the fourth day of his travels when he stopped at a small
cafe for lunch not too far from San Marcos Pass. While dining,
some clever thief unlocked John Henry's vehicle and removed al-
most everything he had packed in the car. At least John Henry knew
what to do-being a lawyer also comes in handy during a personal
crisis once in a while. John Henry called the police and his insur-
ance company. John Henry filled out the necessary police reports
and filed the necessary claims with his insurance agent. He was
thankful for his handwritten complete list of belongings that he had
placed in the glove compartment. It was still there. Let this be a
lesson to all those that are critical of his penchant for meticulous
planning.
John Henry is back at the cafe planning his next move and deter-
mining what he must attend to in order to continue his journey.
Staring down at his coffee, his mind begins to wander its way back to
his treatise on evidence, which is always on his mind, even when out
of sight.
Suppose he has to sue the insurance company to recover on his
Wligore-Scholar and Reformer, 53 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE ScI. 277, 299 (1962).
Again, the facts of the actual journey in this short story are fictionalized to fashion a story
addressing the rationale for the evidence doctrine contained in this story.
75. This example is the basis for the doctrinal application of documentary evidence in
general for the remainder of this story.
1992]
THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:453
claim. Would his proof be in order for such a suit? What would he
need to prove? Did he have it to prove? First, John Henry smugly
thought to himself, "My strongest evidence is me-my live testi-
mony regarding this minor tragedy. Put me on the stand," he
thought, "and let the judge determine my truthfulness. ' 76  He
pondered how he would have fared a hundred years earlier. Not as
well, he thought, because the judge would have denied John Henry
the opportunity to testify on his own behalf. 77 Because he is a party
or interested person in the litigation, he would have been regarded
as a presumptively unreliable source of evidence. Now the matter is
correctly confined to whether John Henry is credible of belief7 8-
that is, unless there is a decedent involved in this matter, but no-
body has died yet in this case.79
But what would happen if, once on the stand, John Henry's mem-
ory failed. He can't imagine that happening in ordinary circum-
stances. However, if he must correctly recall every stolen item, he is
bound to be forgetful. This should not be a problem because his list
can be used to refresh his memory. Then he should be able to re-
sume testifying from his refreshed memory.80 Actually, he thinks it
76. This part of the short story is an example of the question of witness competency.
77. See 2 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 576, at 817 U.H.
Chadbourn rev. 1979) (noting that abolition of interest as disqualification of witness in United
States primarily occurred between 1846 and 1856). In this review narrative, John Henry is
contemplating this approach to competency as if it were "a hundred years earlier." Wigmore
died in 1943. The fictional reference is to a time frame approximately one hundred years
earlier than his death. The important point is that students understand the statutory abolition
of the common law and distinguish that rule from current practice.
78. See id § 576, at 810 (discussing historical evolution of theory of disqualification by
interest and its eventual statutory abolition). Wigmore believed that the syllogism, that per-
sons having a pecuniary interest should be totally excluded because they are likely to testify
falsely, is unsound. Id. He concluded that a pecuniary interest does not necessarily raise the
likelihood or falsehood, and that, even if it did, the risk of falsehood is not best avoided by
excluding such testimony. Rather, cross-examination provides the appropriate means of al-
erting the fact-finder of potential bias. Id. Wigmore's analysis corresponds to the view codi-
fied in Federal Rules 601, 602 & 603.
79. This is a passing reference to the still existing Deadman Statutes in several state
jurisdictions-the surviving remnant of the common law testimonial bar by parties or inter-
ested persons to the litigation. The Deadman Statutes generally exclude the testimony of the
survivor of a transaction with a decedent, when offered against the decedent's estate. See 2J.
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAw § 578, at 819-23 U.H. Chadbourn rev. 1979)
(discussing evolution of Deadman Statutes in United States).
The Federal Rules of Evidence reject the Deadman Statutes by creating a presumption that
every person is competent to be a witness. See FED. R. EvID. 601 ("Every person is competent
to be a witness except as otherwise provided in these rules."); United States v. Lightly, 677
F.2d 1027, 1028 (4th Cir. 1982) (holding that witness is competent unless: (1) shown to lack
personal knowledge of matter that witness is to testify; (2) witness is without capacity to recall;
or, (3) witness does not understand her duty to testify truthfully).
80. See 3J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAw §§ 758-765, at 125-45 U.H.
Chadbourn rev. 1970) (stating that writing or other items generally may be used to stimulate
recollection); see also FED. R. EvID. 612 advisory committee's note (discussing treatment of
writings used to refresh memory while on stand).
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is wise that anything can be used to help revive his memory, includ-
ing his travel guide books or even a match book cover from that San
Marcos cafe.8 1 After all, the facts to be deliberated upon come from
his live testimony and not from the stimulus used to jog his recall.
But, what will occur should John Henry's memory fail him com-
pletely regarding all the contents of his luggage and car?8 2 What
then? A case should not be denied judgment if there is a reliable
substitute for his testimony under oath! Would his list satisfy the
requirements of past recollection recorded so that it may take the
place of his utterance?8 3 He can testify that he had knowledge of
the matter and that the accounting is accurate. He took great pains
to itemize the contents. If his memory is impaired, he would be able
to testify that his memory is exhausted on the matter.8 4 John Henry
made the list a week before the theft. Since John Henry made this
list while he packed,8 5 the judge would likely find John Henry made
his list while the matter was fresh in his memory. There is no ques-
tion of adoption sinceJohn Henry drafted the list himself.86 He will
81. 3 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 758, at 125-28 (J.H.
Chadbourn rev. 1970). Wigmore presents the still valid common law rule that any physical
object or thing, such as a scent or writing, may be used to refresh the memory of a witness.
Several cases, in dicta, provide examples of things allowed to help revive memory: "[I]t may
be a song, or a face, or a newspaper item."Jewett v. United States, 15 F.2d 955, 956 (9th Cir.
1926). It may be "the whistling of a tune, the smell of seaweed, the sight of an old photo-
graph, the taste of nutmeg, the touch of a piece of canvas." Fanelli v. United States Gypsum
Co., 141 F.2d 216, 217 (2d Cir. 1944). It may be "an allusion, even a past statement known to
be false." United States v. Rappy, 157 F.2d 964, 967 (2d Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 806
(1947). It may be "a line from Kipling or the dolorous refrain of 'The Tennessee Waltz'; a
whiff of hickory smoke; the running of the fingers across a swatch of corduroy; the sweet
carbonation of chocolate soda; the sight of a faded snapshot in a long-neglected album."
Baker v. State, 35 Md. App. 593, 602-03, 371 A.2d 699, 705 (1977). This aspect of the law of
refreshing memory is expressly included in this short story to remind students that generally
anything can be used to trigger a witness' memory although Rule 612 is confined to writings.
82. This portion of the story sets up the scenario for the review of past recollection
recorded.
83. The discussion that follows is a review of the key elements of the hearsay exception
for recorded recollection. FED. R. EvID. 803(5). For a discussion of each of the requirements
of the recorded recollection exception to the hearsay rule, see 3 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN
TRIALS AT COMMON LAW §§ 744-749, at 93-107 (J.H. Chadbourn rev. 1970).
84. See 3J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAw § 738, at 90 (J.H. Chadbourn
rev. 1970) (noting that federal courts and many states require express showing of absence of
present recollection as preliminary to use of past recorded recollection).
85. See FED. R. EVID. 803 advisory committee's note (stating that reliability inherent in
record made while events still fresh in mind is guarantee of trustworthiness).
86. See 3 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 748(2), at 101-04 (J.H.
Chadbourn rev. 1982) (noting that it is generally immaterial whether witness was individual
who actually wrote record). The record may have been manually prepared by another. At the
time that the witness sees the record and passes judgment upon its correctness, however, it
becomes, for the witness, the correct record. Id. § 748(2), at 101. Nonetheless, in some in-
stances, the fact that another person prepared the record may cause the court to doubt the
witness' guarantee and, therefore, reject the record. Id.
Federal Rule 803(5) also contains the requirement that the witness have insufficient recol-
lection to testify fully and accurately. See FED. R. EvID. 803 advisory committee's note (dis-
cussing controversy surrounding preliminary requirement that witness' memory be impaired).
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be on the stand subject to cross-examination of these factors.8 7
John Henry concludes that his list is potentially an important piece
of admissible evidence in his case. He should be prepared to testify
to the authenticity of this list, to the fact that this list is the very same
list he prepared prior to hisjourney, and that this document had not
been altered in any way.88
AlthoughJohn Henry still has the original in perfect condition, he
is a careful man indeed.8 9 When he drafted this list he made a car-
bon copy and placed it in his desk drawer for safekeeping. John
Henry prides himself about his thoroughness as he now thinks this
copy would be admissible evidence, instead of his original list, so
long as the insurance company does not dispute the genuineness of
the original in the first place. 90
Of course, all this attention to the details of admissible evidence is
tiring. John Henry sighs, pleased with his assessment of his evi-
dence. As he finishes his cup of coffee John Henry reflects on the
need for economy and efficiency in matters of proof before a
court.91 Otherwise, everyone involved would tire from the effort. A
87. See 3J. WxMoRE, EVIDENCE IN TIALS AT COMMON LAW § 730, at 77 (J.H. Chadbournrev. 1970) (stating that, on direct examination, witness may properly be asked to specify
grounds for recollection, and reasoning that circumstances serving to fix or strengthen suchrecollection may show how witness is justified in such confidence and, thus, party offeringwitness is entitled to benefit). On cross-examination, the opponent is entitled to bring outcircumstances which exhibit the untrustworthiness of the witness' recollection. Id.
88. See FED. R. EVID. 901(a) (requiring authentication or identification as condition pre-cedent to admissibility of evidence). This requirement is satisfied by "evidence sufficient tosupport a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims." Id.; see 7J. WIG-
MORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAw §§ 2129-2130, at 695-711 U.H. Chadbourn rev.1978) (discussing general principles of authentication and models of authenticating
documents).
89. What follows is a review of contents of writings, recordings, and photographs. See
FED. R. EVID. 1001 (defining writings and recordings, originals, and duplicates); FED. R. EVID.1003 (allowing admissibility of duplicates as long as authenticity of original, or unfairness of
admission are not at issue).
90. I use carbon copy as the duplicate here because it was commonly used during thisperiod. In addition, the common law of the best evidence rule evolved with the discussion of
the admissibility of carbon copies. C. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 236, at 712-14 (E. Cleary 3d ed. 1984).
See FED. R. EvID. 1003 (providing that duplicate is admissible to same extent as original,unless there is genuine question regarding authenticity or unfairness would result from ad-mission). Federal Rule 1003 is compatible with Wigmore's discussion of the common law
rule. The proof of loss of the original allows for the use of a copy. See 4 J. WIGMORE, Evi-
DENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW §§ 1188-1198, at 430-60 (J.H. Chadbourn rev. 1972) (dis-cussing authentication of lost documents). "When the execution of a document is not in issue,but only the contents or the fact of the existence of a document of such a tenor, no authentica-
tion is necessary." 7J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2132, at 714 (J.H.
Chadbourn rev. 1978) (emphasis in original).91. This statement of rationale is a transition in the story. On one hand, efficiency andeconomy were factors influencing the drafting of Federal Rule 1003, which sets forth the
guidelines for admitting a duplicate in place of an original. See 5 J. WEINSTEIN, WEINSTEIN'S
EVIDENCE 1004(4)[01]-[02], at 1004-29 to 1004-31, 1003[01], at 1003-04 to 1003-07(199 1) (stating that rule is designed to save time and expense previously wasted in producing
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court should not be burdened with the process of formal proof for
matters that are to be considered but are not reasonably subject to
dispute.92 For instance, how would the judge determine where the
theft had occurred? The judge should be able to accept the fact that
the San Marcos pass is a mountain road in Santa Barbara County in
California and, thus, located within the court's jurisdiction. 93 Practi-
cally every resident of California knows San Marcos Pass and has a
general idea of its location. Also, the judge should be able to take
judicial notice of the location of the San Marcos Cafe since the mat-
ter is capable of accurate determination and is readily verifiable by
maps that are unquestionably accurate. 94 John Henry finishes his
thought that both examples are proper cases of adjudicative fact and
appropriate for judicial notice.95
John Henry makes himself stop toying with the evidence implica-
tions of his insurance claim. He realizes that it would be better to
make a list of items he needs to replace before he can resume his
trip. In addition, he will now have to make another list of contents
that is to be placed once again in his glove compartment. But first,
he looks at his map so that he can modify his travels in order to
reach his friend's home by nightfall.
original when equally reliable counterpart was at hand); see also C. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK
ON EVIDENCE § 236, at 712-14 (E. Cleary 3d ed. 1984) (stating that insistence on original
places undue burden on litigants). On the other hand, economy and efficiency are key policy
reasons for the existence of the law ofjudicial notice. The scope ofjudicial notice covers facts"which are actually so notorious to all that the production of evidence would be unneces-
sary." 9 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2571, at 731 (J.H. Chadbourn
rev. 1981).
92. 9J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAw § 2571, at 731 UJ.H. Chadbourn
rev. 1981).
93. This is an example of geographical fact of common knowledge, one type of adjudica-
tive fact. See C. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 330, at 926 (E. Cleary 3d ed. 1984)
(discussing judicial notice of notorious miscellaneous facts); 9J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRI-
ALS AT COMMON LAW §§ 2580-2582, at 805 (discussing same). Judicial notice of geographical
facts such as location or character of sites is appropriate where such facts meet all require-
ments for judicial notice of adjudicative fact. See Davis v. United States, 185 F.2d 938, 944
(9th Cir. 1950) (holding that court may take judicial notice of principal geographic features of
United States because basic facts regarding natural features are not in serious controversy and
pose no questions of credibility between witnesses); Bradley v. United States, 254 F. 289, 291
(8th Cir. 1918) (concluding that court may take judicial notice of location of city, river, and
railroad lines); Campbell v. United States, 221 F. 186, 188-89 (9th Cir. 1915) (stating that
court takes judicial notice of general topography and climate of territory within its
jurisdiction).
94. See 9 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2566, at 713 (J.H.
Chadboum rev. 1981) (citing example where court declares that fact does not need evidence
and then consults book, such as almanac, to inform itself).
95. Federal Rule 201 is confined to judicial notice of "adjudicative" facts. See FED. R.
EvID. 201 advisory committee's note (defining adjudicative facts as facts of particular case).
Therefore, the two examples given in the short story are adjudicative facts. See generally FED.
R. EvID. 201 advisory committee's note (providing helpful discussion of definition of adjudi-
cative fact).
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D. Narrative Four: Lay Witness Opinion and Expert Testimony
The last short story reviews several of the concepts relating to opinion
testimony. This episode in Wigmore's life facilitates review of the Federal
Rules of Evidence concerning opinion testimony by lay witnesses,9 6 testimony
by expert witnesses,97 bases of opinion testimony by expert witnesses,98 and
opinion testimony on ultimate issues. 9 9 Finally, the story covers the disclo-
sure offacts or data underlying expert opinion. 1 0 0
We find John Henry at his local library, thoroughly engrossed in
reading detective novels. 01 John Henry was addicted to the factual
plots and adventure in detective novels. He would regularly check
out from the library as many as five or six crime mysteries at a time.
Apparently embarrassed over the matter, he was heard to comment
to the librarian that he read detective novels to see how the law was
applied in them. 10 2 As truth would have it, John Henry had an avid
interest in using scientific methods in solving crime,103 and crime
novels often contained new scientific methods that aided the relent-
less detective in solving the mystery. John Henry's interest was put
to good use. He became the organizer and founder of the Scientific
Crime Detection Laboratory, which later became part of the Chi-
cago Police Department. 10 4 John Henry also was partly responsible
for the introduction of special training for police in scientific meth-
ods of crime detection.10 5 Furthermore, John Henry was influential
in persuading judges to accept the contributions of science in admit-
ting evidence in criminal prosecutions.' 06
96. FED. R. EVID. 701.
97. FED. R. EVID. 702.
98. FED. R. EvID. 703.
99. FED. R. EVID. 704.
100. FED. R. EViD. 705.
101. Roalfe,John Henry Wigmore--Scholar and Reformer, 53 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & PO-
LICE Sci. 277, 277, 283 (1962) (noting Wigmore's frequent presence at public library in Ev-
anston, Illinois).
102. Id. (quoting Wigmore imploring Evanston librarian, "Do not, I beg of you, think I
take these solely for amusement. I go through them rapidly to see how the law is carried
out.").
103. Id. at 281-82 (discussing Wigmore's support for involving psychologists, psychia-
trists, and social scientists in crime detection, at time when legal profession showed little in-
terest in complicated crime analysis).
104. W. ROALFE, JOHN HENRY WIGMORE: SCHOLAR AND REFORMER 210 (1977). In fact,this was the first forensic institute of its kind in the country. See Roalfe,John Henry Jigmore-
Scholar and Reformer, 53J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE Sc. 277, 282 (1962) (discussing
Scientific Crime Detection Laboratory of Chicago Police Department).
105. W. ROALFE, JOHN HENRY WIGMORE: SCHOLAR AND REFORMER 210 (1977).
106. See Roalfe, John Henry Wigmore-Scholar and Reformer, 53 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY &
POLICE SCI. 277, 281-82 (1962) (describing Wigmore's persistent efforts to educate judges
and lawyers about scientific crime detection methods); W. ROALFE, JOHN HENRY WIGMORE:
SCHOLAR AND REFORMER 210 (1977) (stating that Wigmore wrote hundreds of letters to indi-
vidual judges on variety of legal issues).
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So here we see John Henry engrossed in his reading of a paper-
back thriller and spending several hours lost in imaginary crime de-
tection. 10 7 Mrs. Robbins came home to find her husband, Mr.
Robbins, dead on the living room floor. She called the police for
assistance. Sam Sneade, the chief detective, is summoned by the
attending police officer. Upon arrival, Sneade studies the scene. He
sees an unfinished glass of wine and an open wine bottle on the
coffee table. There are several fresh fingerprints to be lifted for
analysis. Sneade also finds fresh dirt marks on the carpet that lead
to the body. Yet Robbins is wearing house slippers that are clean,
and his shoes are neatly placed by the entrance to the door. There
are no physical marks on the body suggesting foul play. There is an
open letter apparently written by Robbins' disgruntled business
partner, Jones, on Robbins' desk. Sneade now believes that Rob-
bins was murdered.
The first police officer on the scene indicates to Sneade that Mr.
Smith, Robbins' neighbor, came over when he saw the police arrive.
When told of the bad news, Smith said he wanted to speak to the
detective in charge, but would say nothing else. After examining the
crime scene, Sam Sneade orders that the physical evidence be taken
to the crime lab.
Mrs. Robbins confirms that Jones and her husband have been
quarreling seriously over her husband's desire to dissolve the busi-
ness. Although the business was successful, Robbins wanted to
move on to new endeavors. Yet, Robbins did not want Jones re-
maining in the company alone. He felt the quality of their advertis-
ing business would decline significantly because of Jones' lack of
creative spark. Thus Robbins' name would become associated with
inferior work. Jones was distraught over this breakup.
Later, Sneade interviews Robbins' neighbor, Mr. Smith. Appar-
ently, earlier that evening Smith saw Jones approach Robbins on the
street in front of the Robbins' home. Jones acted friendly and
hugged Robbins. Jones had what looked like a bottle of wine in his
hand, which he gave to Robbins. They were chatting and laughing
as they entered the Robbins' home. Smith was suspicious of this
because just a few nights before, Smith saw the two men arguing
loudly in front of the Robbiiis' home. Jones was holding Robbins'
arms and shoving him. Smith was so worried about his close friend
107. The scenario that follows is created for the purpose of providing illustrations for
opinion testimony and expert witnesses. FED. R. EvrD. 701-705 (governing parties' use of
expert witnesses and testimony in federal courts).
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Robbins that he went to see him the next day. Robbins identified
the man as Jones and confided in Smith about his business troubles.
On the second day of the criminal investigation, Sneade receives
the test results. Poison was added to Robbins' wine glass. There
are fingerprints of someone else, in addition to Robbins', on the
wine glass. The dirt smudges near the body reveal blue wool textile
fibers of the type found in heavy wool clothing, such as a man's
overcoat. The fibers did not come from any of Robbins' clothing.10 8
Unfortunately for John Henry, the novel stops abruptly at the
arrest of Jones and the successful comparison of fingerprints and
fiber samples. John Henry wanted to read about the murder trial.
He ponders, how would the evidence have been handled by the
judge? John Henry is so disappointed by this abrupt ending that he
decides to play out in his mind what would have happened. It is
clear that the author of this novel is neither very clever nor com-
plete. John Henry concludes that he will avoid reading selections
from this author in the future.
John Henry now has the murder trial clearly in mind. Funny, the
judge resembles Wigmore himself. Mr. Smith is on the stand and
commencing testimony. John Henry hears the witness attest, "The
defendant hugged Mr. Robbins. Mr. Jones looked friendly and
happy."10 9 John Henry now sees defense counsel, who looks just
like one of his old adversaries who usually lost to John Henry, rise
and object, saying, "Objection your honor. I move to strike the an-
swer because it is stated in the form of an opinion." The learned
judge pauses and then states, "Overruled!" John Henry agrees with
the ruling because he feels that it makes no sense to force a witness
to speak in unnatural ways on matters that the witness has observed.
What a meaningless exercise it would be to force the witness to
otherwise express the friendly and happy behavior of Jones.
The prosecution's case-in-chief is progressing. There now ap-
108. This part of the short story sets forth the types of scientific evidence that will be the
subject of the expert testimony. See FED. R. EVID. 703 (delineating limitations on and scope of
admissability of expert opinions).
109. See FED. R. EvID. 701 (eliminating common law prohibition on opinion testimony by
lay witnesses and allowing such testimony if rationally based on witness' perception and help-
ful to trier of fact). This part of the short story reviews lay witness opinion testimony. Wig-
more's discussion is in accord with the principle of discretion, rather than a complete
mechanical bar to the use of lay opinion testimony. 7 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT
COMMON LAW § 1924(2), at 32-34 (J.H. Chadbourn rev. 1978). Wigmore believed that to
require strictly factual testimony without any inferences by the lay witness would be virtually
impossible. Id. Given the problems inherent in applying the common law lay-opinion rule,
Wigmore believed that courts should invite any rationally-based lay testimony that could aid
the trier of fact. See id. (discarding common law rule and admitting lay opinion testimony)
(citing Paquette v. Connecticut Valley Lumber Co., 79 N.H. 288, 109 A. 836 (1919)).
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pears on the stand a stately older woman with wire-rimmed specta-
cles. She testifies that she has undergone extensive post graduate
training in the chemical analysis of toxins as well as in textile com-
position analysis.1 0 The background of this witness persuades John
Henry that this woman in fact possesses specialized knowledge that
would permit her to speak about some of the physical evidence in
this case in a more sophisticated way than could an ordinary lay per-
son. Her information would be useful in accurately understanding
the significance of the wine and fiber tests. The witness is now com-
menting on the general acceptance of these tests in her forensic
fields, and she further discusses several factors that leadJohn Henry
to believe that these tests are to be regarded as sufficiently relia-
ble."1 ' The judge rules that the witness is qualified to testify as an
expert in toxicology and fiber analysis, and that her testimony about
the scientific tests will be sufficiently reliable for the jury to hear as
evidence.
The prosecution proceeds with an orderly examination of this ex-
110. See FED. R. EVID. 702 (allowing witness possessing specialized knowledge to testify if
such knowledge would assist trier of fact). I include the qualifying of an expert in this short
story because, in addition to being an admissibility issue, qualifying an expert witness adds to
the witness' credibility and is a matter of trial advocacy skill. Wigmore emphasized the neces-
sity for establishing the foundation of "experiential capacity." 2 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN
TRIALS AT COMMON L,w § 555, at 749-50 (J.H. Chadboum rev. 1979). He believed that ca-
pacity is a relative concept dependent on the topic at hand and the type of experience re-
quired. Id. In other words, there is no fixed class of experts since an individual gains
expertise through experience, not by association, and one need not be a professional or em-
ployed in an area of expertise to qualify as an expert. Id.
Wigmore differentiated between subjects that require merely "general" or "ordinary" ex-
perience, such as an expertise in sensing one's surroundings, shared by all able-bodied
humans, and matters requiring special experience gained through occupation, scientific re-
search, or otherwise. Id. § 556, at 750-52. Expert witnesses with specialized knowledge must
be qualified prior to testifying. Id. Wigmore believed that no special experience should be
required to qualify an expert unless it would be presumptuous under the circumstances for a
person of ordinary experience to trust his own senses in testifying. Id. § 559, at 755. Where
special experience is required of a witness, his qualifications must be shown by the sponsoring
party. Id. § 560, at 755-56.
111. See FED. R. EvID. 703 (delineating types of evidence of information experts may rely
upon). Here I refer to the requirement of validation of the scientific theory or method relied
upon by the expert. Federal Rule 703 permits the expert to rely on data as long as it is"reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences
upon the subject." Id. Although I include the words "general acceptance" in the text, I do
not cover the contents of the doctrine of general acceptance in this review. See Frye v. United
States, 293 F. 1013, 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (holding evidence of systolic blood pressure decep-
tion test inadmissible due to its lack of general acceptance by experts in field and creating
general standard for admitting scientific evidence). Wigmore's discussion of these issues is
brief and he accepts outright the necessity for scientific technology in matters of proof. Wig-
more does not go into the criteria for determining validity, other than in his case summaries.
See 2 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAw § 665(a), at 917-19 (J.H. Chadboum
rev. 1979) (acknowledging that scientist may employ "standard instruments" to prove things,
even though such instruments may replace human senses); id. § 665(b), at 919-26 (arguing
that expert should be permitted to base testimony on what has been written by other experts
in field).
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pert. The jurors look very attentive. Further along in her testi-
mony, the expert states that her fiber analysis is based in part upon a
report by a colleague who did the initial fiber scanning. 112 It was
regular procedure that initial microscopic scanning be conducted
before she performs the chemical analysis. Defense counsel now ob-
jects to this expert's testimony. He further moves that her testi-
mony be struck because it cannot be relevant if her statements are
not based on evidence in the record. The fiber scan report had not
been introduced. Thejudge abruptly overrules the objection. John
Henry justifies this ruling to himself. It seems an injustice to deny
the jury assistance in understanding the evidence when the expert
has relied upon the type of information regularly relied upon in
making such scientific findings.' 13 It makes no sense to John Henry
to say that what scientists relied upon in conducting an investigation
or experiment is not trustworthy for consideration by the jury. If
defense counsel is worried about the accuracy of the scan or
whether the report of the scan is of the correct sample, his remedy is
to cross-examine the witness. 114
The prosecution is now proceeding with testimony regarding the
contents of the wine glass. The prosecutor asks the witness what
her analysis of the wine left in the glass revealed. Counsel for the
defense objects to this line of questioning because the witness has
yet to testify as to the underlying facts that would support her con-
clusion. Both the judge and John Henry grow weary with this de-
fense counsel. The judge exclaims, "Counsel, I'm sure you know as
112. 2 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 665(b), at 919 U.H.
Chadbourn rev. 1979). Here I provide an example of a basis of expert opinion testimony on
data not part of the record. See FED. R. EVID. 703 (stating that information reasonably relied
upon by members of profession may be part of expert's opinion testimony).
113. See 2 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 665(b), at 919-26 U.H.
Chadboum rev. 1979) (acknowledging expert witness may rely on data prepared by other
experts in field).
114. This section covers the various sources that an expert may rely on in deriving an
opinion under the Federal Rules of Evidence. See FED. R. EVID. 703 advisory committee's
note (providing that experts may base testimony on information received, which need not be
independently admissible). The Federal Rules recognize three sources of data supporting
expert opinion: (1) firsthand observation of the expert witness; (2) presentations at trial, in-
cluding the use of hypothetical questions; and, (3) briefing of expert through outside, sepa-
rate from the personal observations of the expert witness. Id. The Federal Rules departed
from the common law regarding whether a party must first introduce the basis of an expert's
opinion before allowing the expert's testimony into evidence. See FED. R. EVID. 705 advisory
committee's note (dealing with disclosure of facts or data underlying expert opinion). Federal
Rule 705 eliminates the common law requirement that the proponent must bring out the basis
of an expert's opinion on direct examination, and the rule permits the opponent to inquire
into such basis during cross-examination. Id. The advisory committee acknowledges that
Federal Rule 705 is criticized for giving the proponent an unfair advantage at trial by relieving
that party of the burden of presenting the bases for an expert's opinion, but further notes that
the rule has a long history supporting it in state statutes. Id.
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well as I do that such a foundation is no longer required before this
expert can state her findings. 11 5 I imagine the prosecution is getting
to the matter, and you will have the opportunity to cross-ex-
amine. 1 16 Overruled!"
The trial, continues and the prosecution succeeds in eliciting testi-
mony showing that the wine glass contained wine tainted with arse-
nic, and that the fiber analysis of the dirt showed that the fibers
matched defendant's wool coat. The prosecution presents further
evidence of defendant's guilt. Finally, the prosecution rests!
We are now in the midst ofJones' temporary insanity defense. 17
His attorney is examining a psychiatrist who had interviewed Jones
and looked at reports on Jones to render an opinion as to whether
Jones possessed the specific intent to kill Robbins. That is, did
Jones suffer from a mental condition or defect that was directly re-
sponsible for Jones' actions? The jury has just heard the doctor's
observations ofJones' symptoms, what the symptoms mean, and the
clinical consequences of such a condition. The jury now hears de-
fense counsel ask, "What is your opinion, to a reasonable degree of
certainty, as to whether at the time of this tragedy, Mr. Jones was
insane?" The prosecutor quickly shouts, "Objection. This question
calls for a conclusion better left for the jury." The judge nods in
agreement and matter-of-factly says, "Sustained." 118 John Henry is
troubled by this ruling but understands why the judge found the
115. FED. R. EVID. 705; see Iconco v.Jensen Constr. Co., 622 F.2d 1291, 1293 (8th Cir.
1980) (ruling in construction contract case that not all facts underlying opinion of contracting
expert must be brought out by proponent); Cunningham v. Gans, 507 F.2d 496, 501 (2d Cir.
1974) (reversing judgment for defendant because plaintiff was unable to elicit testimony dur-
ing direct examination of expert witness due to repeated sustained objections concerning
facts underlying witness' opinion).
116. See FED. R. EvID. 705 advisory committee's note (providing that opponent may elicit
bases of expert's opinion on cross-examination). The advisory committee noted that those
who consider it unfair to burden the opponent with the task of bringing out the basis of an
expert's opinion on cross-examination should recognize that the opponent need only bring
out facts unfavorable to the witness. Id. See International Adhesive Coating Co. v. Bolton
Emerson Int'l, Inc., 851 F.2d 540, 544-45 (Ist Cir. 1988) (ruling that, where plaintiff's expert
witness' explanation of underlying documentation is brief, defendant has ample opportunity
to investigate, expose, and rebut any allegedly insupportable opinions on cross-examination);
Polk v. Ford Motor Co., 529 F.2d 259, 271 (8th Cir.) (holding that any weakness in underpin-
nings of expert's opinion may be developed on cross-examination and will go to weight and
credibility of testimony), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 907 (1976).
117. This is the fact scenario for the discussion in the short story concerning opinion
testimony on ultimate issues. See FED. R. EVID. 704(b) (prohibiting expert, testifying about
mental state of defendant in criminal case, from expressing opinion as to whether defendant
has mental condition constituting element or defense to crime charged).
118. 7 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1921 at 21-26 (J.H.
Chadbourn rev. 1978). Wigmore found the common law rule disallowing opinion testimony
on "ultimate issues" to be problematic, operating chiefly to exclude necessary testimony. See
id. (stating that rule disallowing opinion testimony on every issue before jury was impractical,
misconceived, and lacked justification).
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question improper. In criminal matters, conclusions on state of
mind when involving an element of the charge or defense are best
left for the jury. 119
John Henry is ready to move to closing arguments when his day-
dreaming abruptly ends. The librarian is standing over John Henry
announcing that the library is closing in five minutes. "Too bad,"
he thought, "I am not finished. I haven't reached the end. Why
can't the librarian wait for the jury verdict to come in?" There is a
good side to this interruption, however, because instead of in-
venting a better crime novel, John Henry can check out and take
home his other selection. This new thriller involves the prosecution
of a serial killer!
II. CREATING SHORT STORIES: A FRAMEWORK
FOR OTHER STORYTELLERS
In drafting these review narratives, I rely on fundamental drafting
premises and guidelines. Although I am prone to view the creation
of these short stories as an intuitive, creative process, there are nev-
ertheless aspects of my approach which may enable others to begin
the process of writing short stories for use in the classroom. There-
fore, I will elaborate on how I construct the stories for those readers
who also wish to be storywriters.
At the outset, I structure the doctrinal coverage of my course into
segments of selected rules of law, among which I am able to draw
connections. For instance, the reader will note that I combine the
rules on relevant evidence with the subsequent "relevant but" rules
for the first short story, Relevancy and Its Limits.120 When I approach
drafting the short story, therefore, I am limited to a finite amount of
doctrine. Further, the purpose of the short story is to review the
major premises and structures of the rules of law. Thus, I am lim-
119. FED. R. EVID. 704(b). The principle of leaving conclusions on the defendant's state
of mind to the jury when involving a criminal charge or defense is the rationale behind Fed-
eral Rule 704(b). For examples of different applications of Federal Rule 704(b), see United
States v. Hillsberg, 812 F.2d 328, 331-32 (7th Cir.) (excluding psychiatrist's testimony con-
cerning defendant's capacity for specific intent required for conviction of second degree mur-
der, and holding that such is ultimate issue for jury alone), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987);
United States v. Edwards, 819 F.2d 262, 265-66 (1 1th Cir. 1987) (ruling psychiatrist's opin-
ion, that the behavior of defendant charged with unarmed bank robbery does not necessarily
indicate active manic state, is not impermissible in testimony on defendant's sanity); United
States v. Gold, 661 F. Supp. 1127, 1132 (D.D.C. 1987) (holding that defendant charged with
illegal drug distribution may put on expert psychiatric testimony concerning defendant's
mental state or condition at time of alleged crime, but expert may not testify concerning de-
fendant's state of mind if it constitutes element of crime).
120. See supra notes 24-45 and accompanying text.
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ited in the extent of sophisticated interpretation that needs inclu-
sion in the story.
Next, I research the facts surrounding the setting for my short
stories. I select interesting facts about Wigmore's personal life that
I think will make this scholar real in the minds of students, as well as
make the reasoning processes directly inferable from the facts of the
story.
In addition, I structure each story to begin with a non-legal ad-
venture or journey. I seek to draw attention to the subject matter
without separating the rules from life's experiences. After all, it is
life's experiences which give rise to the creation of rules of law. I
thus have two levels of interpretation occurring in each short story.
One level of interpretation occurs in the telling of the adventure
itself. The second level of interpretation occurs in the reflection on
the meaning of the facts of the adventure as it relates to the Federal
Rules of Evidence under review. Again, the purpose for the later
level of reflection is to reinforce the fact that reasoning is a product
of applying a premise or rule to an event or occurrence. To accom-
plish this task, I design these reflections to occur in the activities of
the personal life of Wigmore. I write the story in a manner that
allows the student to substitute herself for Wigmore. This transfer-
ence is intended to further demystify the reasoning process.
The doctrinal coverage is designed to go from the simple to the
complex aspects of the law step-by-step. The writing style is di-
rected at oral communication. Thus, my goal is easy listening by the
audience. I write, therefore, in short sentences and keep the lan-
guage simple. In addition, I emphasize language of action in the
review narratives to keep the students' minds traveling with the
story. This is also why I intentionally use the present verb tense,
which helps to place the students in the mind of Wigmore.
Lastly, I schedule time exclusively for the drafting of the story af-
ter I teach the specific section of evidence under review. I choose
this method of timing because I want the students' participation in
those particular classes to be fresh in my memory. I am sure that
this backdrop influences the contours of each of the stories. Fur-
ther, my attention is directed solely to the pariticular drafting chal-
lenge at hand. I am not distracted by the need to draft the stories
yet to come.
III. STUDENT RESPONSES TO STORYTELLING
The students' reactions to storytelling sheds light on the utility of
this teaching method. Interestingly, several students whom I identi-
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fled as showing difficulty in establishing a structural framework for
doctrinal analysis individually requested copies of the short stories
at the end of the semester to assist them in studying for the final
examination. A few of the gifted students commented that they en-
joyed the "puzzle-like" experience of unraveling the content of the
stories. During review sessions, students referred to the short sto-
ries in discussing the answers to the multiple-choice questions. Fur-
thermore, I received no complaint about the use of the review
narratives in class. Thus, the narrative response to my storytelling
reveals that it is a technique that students can use positively to rein-
force structure and meaning in the study of law.
